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STATEME!NT OF THE NATURE: OF 'IHE CASE
Bryan Jay Stephens appeals from the Order of Dismissal With Prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 4l(b) U.R.C.P.
DISPOSITIOn IN THE LOWER COURT

The case came on before the Court, Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge,
presiding, on defendant's motion for dismissal.

The

~rties

argued

the motion, and submitted affidavits and memoranda of legal authority
in support of their respective positions.

This appeal is brought from

the final judgment of the Court wherein plaintiff's case was dismissed
with prejudice pu1~nt to Rule 4l(b) U.R.C.P. on November 24, 1978.

Appellant

Stephe~~

Court and an order

seeks reversal of the

re~ndi~g

Court for a trial on tne

judb~ent

of the lower

the case to the Third Judicial District

~erits.
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This appeal seeks reversal of the order of the 'lh1zd.

"'

~,.

Court dismissing plaintiff's lawsuit with pxejudioe :pi1DU&D\ tt

•(

...

: ~-

:.., • .t

Rule 41(b) U.R,C.P. after defendant claimed pla1Dtuf' ha4 h1l8l
to diligently prosecute the action. (R. 24-2.5)

'l'b.e •ttar. . . _._

mitted to the Court on the file and record in the case, 1Dcl.ud.1Dc
the affidavits of counsel, memorandums of law, and on oral arjpiMDt.
(R. 21-2), 26-)2)
The plaintiff originally sued these same defendants on July 28;

1971, in case no. 200474.

That matter was dismissed without pre-

judice in June, 1972, at the request of plaintiff's counsel,

shortl7

before trial was scheduled, and upon stipulation of defendants.
Plaintiff filed the instant case, through attorney Richard Day
on November 1), 1972, claiming damages in excess of $100,000 for
personal injuries sustained as a result of an assault and battery
allegedly committed by defendant Safeway Store employees and occurring
on its premises. (R. 2-4)
The defendants filed a general denial in answer to the complaint,
and served interrogatories therewith. (R. 5-10)

Attorney Da.y then

withdrew from the case on December 13, 1972, leaving plaintiff in
the position of representing hemself. (R. 12, 13)
Thereafter, during February, 1973, defendants sought to dismiss
the complaint through motion to compel answers to interrogatories.
(R. 14,15)

Plaintiff appeared in person and was given an additional

JO days to answer, (R. 17) and then prepared and filed the requested
answers as best he could. (R. 18-19)

Plaintiff then employed his
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1973.

The ·respective attorneys for the parties communicated regarding
the various aspects of the case at various times during
)1)

1973, (R. 29,

..

No further proceedings directly involving.the Court were brought

by either party until the motion to dismiss which is the subject of

this appeal was filed by defendant.

ARGUMENT

WHERE PLAINTIFF SHOWED .nJSTIFIABLE EXCUSE FOR DELAY IN SETTING CASE
FOR TRIAL, IT WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR LOWER COURT TO DISMISS
WITH PREJUDICE IN ABSENCE OF ANY FACTUAL SHOWING OF PREJUDICE TO
DEFENDANT, AND WHERE SAID DISMISSAL RESULTED IN INJUSTICE TO PLAINTIFF

This Court has recently considered several Rule 4l(b) cases which,
it is submitted, are dispositive of the issue presently before this
Court.

The leading case, Utah Oil Co. v. Harris,

565 P.2d 1135 (1977)

has set forth guidelines for determining justifiable excuse for delay.
Accordingly, this Court must consider the following well-established
principles:
1.

Conduct of both parties.

2.

The opportunity each has had to move the case forward.

3. What each of the parties have done to move the case forward.
4.

What difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the
other side.

5. And, most important, whether injustice may result from the
dismissal.
These principles are well-established in the followins cases which
were cited with apyroval in Utah Oil, sup=: See Hestin;hou::;e Electric
Suuply Co. v. Paul ·,{. Larsen Contractor, Inc., _544 P. 2d 876 (19(7);
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Polk V, Ivers, 561 P.2d 16?5 (1977); Johnson v. Joirebg.l!!l,

.m ]t at
4

1369 (1977); Crystal Lime &: Cement Co. v. RobbiDB, 5.)8 P.all.)tU _(1975).

•

In Johnson v. Firebrand, supra, the action lay tar tour ,_,..
without either party taking an active interest in the 11U.t.t.oa, 81111
a1 though no reasons were given for the delay, the Court bel4 'Uaat it

was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to dismiss with-

plll~

on that ground alone.

In Westinghouse, supra, this Court reversed a dismissal

with~

judice, and stated:
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch aDd. to 1110'¥8
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is
even more important to keep in mind that the very rEBson for the existence of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be hM.rd and.
to do justice between them. In conformity with that principle the
courts generally tend to favor granting relief from default judgments
where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party."
In the federal courts in Rule 4l(b) cases, it has been pointed out
that dismissal is a very harsh remedy which should be used only 1n the
most extreme situations.
In Flaska v. Little Marine Constr. Co. (1968, CA5 Fla.) J89 F.2d
885, cert den 392 U.S. 928, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1387, 88 S. Ct. 2287, the Court
pointed out that dismissal is too harsh a remedy except in extreme
situations where there is a clear record of delay or con~macious conduct by plaintiff, and further stated that the court should first resort
to the wide raEge of lesser sanctions which keep litigation moving, but
without depriving the litigant of his day in court.
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The allegations that plaintiff refused to answer interrogatories

ma.y be :read.Uyexplli.ned on the basis of the fact that defendant knew
that plaintiff was not represented by counsel at that time, and that
defendants were seeking to take advantage of plaintiff while plaintiff
was acting as his own attorney,

In applying the principles and guidelines established in this
jurisdiction, it is obvious that great injustice will be done ·to
plaintiff by dismissing his meritorious claim.

It is clear that he

has a gpod cause of action against defendants based upon the unprovoked
assault and battery, during which he sustained severe and permanent
injuries, and further for the malicious and unwarranted subsequent
prosecution of plaintiff for abusive language wherein plaintiff was
acquitted.
It is fundamental to our system of justice that an injured plaintlif
be given his day in court, and that he should not be, in effect, de-

faulted, for technical procedural reasons.
It is not disputed that the defendant has
opportunity to get this case ready for trial.

h~d

more than an equal

Although defendant claims

to have been thoroughly prepared for trial of the first case in 1972,
there h·. nothing to indicate that defendant toolc any action to move the
case along subsequent to 1973, although they had every opportunity to
so do.

It would appear that defendants had no particular urgency in

moving the casco foraard, although they admit that their discovery was
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,
complete, their witnesses have been interviewed, &lid are aw.Uabl.e,
and that they have taken the plaintiff's deposition.
There have been no facts submitted by defendants which would 111111cate that the existing delay in a trial date has prejudiced their cue
in any way,

Their witnesses are persons who reside and woxk 1n tba

local area.

It is believed by plaintiff that these are mainly store

employees, including off-duty law enforcement officers, and that 110st
are still available.

Much of the testimony which could be elicited

from such witnesses will be cumulative.

Plaintiff believes that those

witnesses are only relevant as to the liability issues.

It is submitted

that there would be 11 ttle or no difficulty for defendant to proceed to
a trial on the merits without prejudice due to any delay.
Plaintiff, through counsel, states to this Court the belief that
there has been diligent preparation on this case, and that any delay has
not been unreasonable, in view of the fact that this action involves
claim for personal injuries, and respectfully points out that there has
been activity in seeking out competent medical examination and treatment for plaintiff's injuries,
Plaintiff was seeking to ascertain the necessity for future medical
attention.

Even at the present time, plaintiff suffers from headaches,

dental problems, and neurological disorders caused by the brutal beating
he received at the defendants' hands.

Plaintiff has been disabled by

his injuries and has rzd difficulty in finding employment, and in carrying out the norFal functions of his life.

-6-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. •!

It is submitted that it was not an unreasonable delay to not set
the matter on for trial prior to ascertaining the true nature and
extent of plaintiff's injuries, including the question regarding
the extent of long-term permanent damage.

The uncertainty regarding

plaintiff's condition had a great deal to do with the length of time
which was allowed to transpire.

During 1973, plaintiff's counsel had conversations and otherwise
communicated with defense counsel about this case.

He is of the

opinion that defendants expressed no particular urgency in getting
this case to trial.

On the contrary, the possibility of a negotiated

settlement was definitely considered, and plaintiff's counsel was left
with the understanding that these negotiations would continue as
additional medical information and facts concerning the injuries
could be developed.

Defendants' attorneys have made no attempt to

contact plaintiff's counsel for several years after the last of these
discussions.
It is submitted that it would be unjust and unfair to allow the
dismissal to stand. uncorrected and unreversed by this court.

The

defendant has suffered no prejudice in going forward with their
defense, while

th~

plaintiff has suffered great injustice.

The

opinions of this court, and the better reasoning and principle of
t:,e law re'luires that to avoid injustice, this matter must be reversed
a~d

remanded for disposition on the

~erits.

CO;lCLUSIOli

Plaintiff res):'2ctfully :::.ubr:Jits tl1c1t tlF' dcch;ion of th·o Third
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Dated: April 6, 1979

JOHN D. RUSSELL
Attorney for Appellant
4JO Judge Bullding
8 East Bmadway
Sa.lt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant were served upon DefendantRespondent by placing said copies, postage prepaid, in the U,S,
Mail and addressed to J. Steven Newton, Attorney at Law, 1)6
South Main Street, Suite 404 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
this _day of April, 1979.
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